INTRODUCTION
Multilateral corporations' activities span across global markets. Yet antitrust laws regulating those activities remain national. Europeans can ban American companies from merging, 1 tell American companies how to design their products, 2 or determine what kind of discounts American companies are permitted to off er to their customers. 3 Chinese can impose conditions on off -shore mergers. 4 And Brazilians can insist on reviewing a transaction with minimal connections to the Brazilian market. 5 As the global web of antitrust laws thickens, companies are forced to navigate an increasingly complex regulatory environment. The need to comply with multiple diff erent domestic antitrust regimes exposes multinational corporations to additional transaction costs, delays, and uncertainty. Simultaneous application of many antitrust laws carries the risk of enforcement confl icts and is likely to lead to global overenforcement of antitrust laws. A lack of international antitrust regulation may also lead to antitrust protectionism if states underenforce their antitrust laws towards domestic corporations, while overenforcing those same laws towards foreign corporations. 6 These concerns have sparked demands to move away from decentralized antitrust * Thanks to Hanna Chung for outstanding research assistance. enforcement in favor of an international antitrust regime. 7 However, no overarching international antitrust regime has been established. Instead, states seek to mitigate the negative externalities embedded in decentralized antitrust enforcement largely through bilateral cooperation and voluntary multilateral norms.
This chapter describes the key issues underlying international antitrust law. 8 Section I reviews the recent proliferation of antitrust laws around the world, explaining why states adopt antitrust laws and why such laws may diff er across jurisdictions. Section II discusses the most important problems embedded in the current system of multijurisdictional antitrust enforcement, focusing on increased transaction costs and uncertainties, enforcement confl icts, antitrust protectionism, and global overenforcement of antitrust laws. Section III discusses eff orts to mitigate these problems through international cooperation. After reviewing the current state of antitrust cooperation, it examines why, despite the well-accepted ineffi ciencies embedded in the current system, no global antitrust regime exists. The fi nal section off ers suggestions for the direction of future scholarship in the fi eld.
I PROLIFERATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS
Over the last two decades, the number of antitrust jurisdictions has increased dramatically. Today, over 100 countries have adopted domestic antitrust laws. 9 In 1989, 100 years after the fi rst antitrust law was enacted in Canada, followed by the adoption of the Sherman Act in the United States one year later , 10 only 39 countries had antitrust laws.
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union became a watershed moment for the adoption of antitrust laws. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, former communist countries began to embrace free markets, adopting domestic antitrust laws in the process. 12 The implementation of antitrust laws by Eastern European countries coincided with the awakening of the 'Asian tigers' to the ability of free markets and competition to stimulate economic growth. Following these developments, almost all developed countries (94%) and almost half of all emerging and developing countries in the world (47%) have now enacted domestic antitrust laws.
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A Why States Adopt Antitrust Laws
Motivations for adopting domestic antitrust rules vary. Some countries adopt antitrust laws because they believe that such laws increase their domestic welfare. Antitrust laws foster strong domestic competition, which also tends to increase the competitiveness of these same domestic fi rms in global markets.
14 Domestic antitrust regimes can also instill a sense of confi dence in a country's regulatory environment, which helps the country attract more international investment. 15 At times, countries adopt antitrust statutes in response to a change in the country's economic philosophy. Many developing countries in Latin America and Asia, for instance, discovered fi rst-hand the harmfulness of import substitution, negative eff ects of price controls, and ineffi ciencies of state-owned enterprises. These experiences led them to pursue market-oriented policies, including enacting antitrust regimes to foster effi ciency and stimulate competition. 16 Similarly, several former Soviet satellites wanted to distance themselves from the state-driven economic policies by voluntarily embracing laws that dismantled state monopolies and established economies with competitive pressures. 17 International institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD, have enthusiastically supported these endeavors. They have endorsed antitrust policies as drivers of economic development and off ered technical assistance to support emerging economies' eff orts to establish antitrust regimes. Other countries adopt antitrust laws more reluctantly, in response to international pressure or inducement to secure other benefi ts, including trade deals. International institutions' approach to lending support, for instance, has ranged from persuasion and assistance to imposing the requirement to adopt antitrust laws as a condition for loans and other funding. Indonesia and Zambia, for instance, adopted antitrust laws as part of structural adjustment programs that were fi nanced by the IMF and the World Bank. 19 Several countries have adopted antitrust laws in response to their trading partners' demands to do so. For instance, Guatemala, Singapore, and Jordan enacted antitrust laws as a condition for securing a free trade agreement with the United States. 20 The EU employs the strategy of trade conditionality even more frequently and eff ectively. Aspiring Member States or states seeking trade agreements with the EU have to adopt antitrust laws as a condition for the trade agreement or in preparation for their membership. 21 Some countries choose not to adopt antitrust laws. The reasons vary, but given that countries without antitrust laws are predominantly the least developed economies, an obvious reason is that antitrust enforcement is costly. 22 Adopting and enforcing antitrust laws requires institutional capacity, technical expertise, and economic resources that these countries lack. Even if an economic argument can be made that competitive markets support developing countries' quest for economic growth and higher levels of development, 23 antitrust laws may not be a regulatory priority given the limited 407 (1997-1998 ) (observing that the support of advisory bodies and multinational donors such as the World Bank, the OECD, and UNCTAD have played an active role in shaping developing countries' newly adopted laws).
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Janow, supra note 18, at 18 and n.15 (reporting that the World Bank/IMF conditioned Indonesia's aid to the establishment of a domestic competition law); UNCTAD, Report of the Third United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices para. 63, U.N. Doc. TD/ RBP/CONF.4/15 (1996) , available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/511/11/ PDF/G9651111.pdf (reporting that Zambia had enacted a statute establishing a Competition Commission as a part of its World Bank-fi nanced 'structural adjustment programme'); Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and Indonesia, 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 579, 589 (2000) . 20 Evans, supra note 9, at 5. 21 Evans, supra note 9, at 10, 12 (noting that countries such as Finland and Sweden enacted competition laws in order to join the European Union); see Mark R.A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis, 43 Antitrust Bull. 105, 120, 121 n.51 (1998) (noting that many current members of the European Community, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Poland, adopted competition policies as a part of trade agreements before they were members). 22 See Fox, supra note 7, at 1794. 23 Porter, supra note 14, at 636; Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 Sw. J.L. and Trade Am. 211, 212-13 (2006-2007) (suggesting that, although developing nations stand to gain economic benefi ts from adopting antitrust laws, one should not expect the antitrust law of those nations to be identical to the law of developed nations, since developing nations have other pressing priorities, such as poverty); Peter A.G. van government resources and the number of challenges these countries face. 24 Also, developed countries with small, open markets may conclude that antitrust laws would only yield marginal gains for them. Exposure to foreign competition may be suffi cient to make domestic markets competitive. 25 This is a reason why Singapore and Hong Kong have taken such a long time to consider antitrust laws in earnest.
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B The Global Reach of Local Antitrust Laws
Given that over 100 countries have antitrust laws, a critical question is to determine which laws apply to which international business activity. The jurisdictional reach of domestic antitrust laws is often determined according to an 'eff ects doctrine'. This doctrine entails that a state can apply its antitrust laws to any anticompetitive conduct that has an eff ect on its domestic market. 27 No state can exercise exclusive jurisdiction in antitrust matters. 28 Thus, if a multinational corporation operates in several markets, it is likely to be subject to multiple antitrust laws simultaneously.
The United States and the EU have frequently resorted to extra-territorial enforcement of their antitrust laws. 29 The early antitrust jurisprudence in the United States denied the principle of extra-territoriality. In the American Banana case, the US Supreme Court held that US antitrust laws only extend to acts that take place within the United States' borders. 30 Gradually, however, the Supreme Court moved away from the territoriality 24 Editorial, The Real Lesson of the Cancun Failure, Financial Times (London), 23 September 2003, at 16 ('It is absurd to push, as the EU has done, to impose rules in complex areas such as competition and investment on countries so poor that some cannot even aff ord WTO diplomatic representation'). 25 Fox, supra note 7, at 1794. In this respect, antitrust diff ers from areas such as corporate law, where the internal aff airs of the corporation are regulated exclusively by the laws of the state where the corporation was established. This creates a very diff erent dynamic and incentives for regulatory competition.
29
The United States and the European Union apply their antitrust laws to the conduct of foreign corporations as long the conduct has had an 'eff ect' on their domestic market. See principle and focused on the eff ects of foreign conduct on the domestic market. 31 The landmark case of extra-territoriality in the United States was the Hartford Fire case, where the Supreme Court affi rmed that 'the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial eff ect in the United States'. The Court held that considerations of international comity do not prevent US courts from attaching jurisdiction in cases where there is no true confl ict between US and foreign law. 32 Most recently, the Supreme Court revisited the question of extra-territorial application of antitrust laws in the Empagran case. Invoking the principle of international comity, it limited the extra-territorial reach of the Sherman Act by holding that the Act did not extend to cases where a foreign plaintiff suff ers an injury that is independent of any domestic harm.
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Notwithstanding its historically more cautious stand towards antitrust extraterritoriality, the EU today is prepared to extend its antitrust jurisdiction to foreign conduct. 34 The European Court of Justice re-affi rmed the extra-territorial application of European antitrust laws in the Wood Pulp case. 35 The Commission has also exercised jurisdiction over mergers involving foreign companies whenever merging parties have exceeded the EU's revenue-based thresholds for notifi cation. 36 However, many other 31 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ('it is settled law -as "Limited" itself agrees -that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize'). Although this is a Second Circuit case, it has the binding eff ect of a Supreme Court case because the Court lacked quorum and had to refer the case. See id. at 416. The Alcoa case held that the Sherman Act extends to foreign conduct if such conduct 'were intended to aff ect imports and did aff ect them'. Id. at 444. But see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976) (softening the Alcoa eff ects test with a requirement that courts must weigh the interests of foreign states); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 (1993) (acknowledging that comity considerations may apply, but only where there is a 'true confl ict'). 32 Implicitly, the Court also re-affi rmed the simultaneous applicability of multiple antitrust laws, and the requirement that an individual must comply with all those laws absent true confl ict. True confl ict exists only when one jurisdiction requires (as opposed to permits) a conduct that is prohibited by another jurisdiction. In most cases, a company can therefore ensure its compliance with multiple antitrust laws by simply conforming to the strictest jurisdiction. This phenomenon of 'strictest regime wins' is discussed infra. 38 India, departing from its previous practice of denying extra-territorial application of its antitrust laws, has also revised its antitrust laws to embrace the eff ects doctrine.
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C Why Antitrust Laws Differ Across Jurisdictions
In principle, all states could enforce the same antitrust laws. The basic economic theory informing antitrust enforcement applies regardless of the particular market or the specifi c situation. 40 Most states' antitrust laws also purport to promote the same goal: consumer welfare. Yet, a closer look at the laws and their enforcement reveals remarkable diff erences across the jurisdictions.
Substantive laws may often appear similar, given that most antitrust jurisdictions have chosen to adopt either US-or EU-style antitrust laws. 41 However, many states, while sharing the fundamental policy goal of consumer welfare, seek to pursue a wider set of objectives through their antitrust laws. These may include the advancement of public interest or 'fair' competition, the protection of small-and medium-sized enterprises, employment, or more equitable distribution of ownership. 42 Even where the substantive Evans, supra note 9, at 8. 41 See Fox, supra note 7, at 1799 (suggesting that the EU and the United States are locked in a competition to export their competition laws and become the dominant antitrust model for the world).
rules are similar, the actual enforcement (or, at times, nonenforcement) of those laws can lead to diff erent outcomes in practice. Also, remedial options diff er from one country to another: some countries choose to criminalize anticompetitive conduct; others prefer resorting to administrative fi nes and injunctive relief. 43 Scholars have examined sources for divergence in states' antitrust laws. Some suggest that the size and openness of the economy determine the type of antitrust law that is optimal for a country. 44 Also, market structures and prevailing conditions for cooperation diff er, at times calling for dissimilar antitrust laws. This may be a result of the country's history of state-owned businesses, or a refl ection of the government's adherence to a diff erent economic ideology. 45 Antitrust laws are also likely to refl ect the level of economic development in the country. 46 Countries with abundant resources, well-established institutions, and technical expertise are more likely to be able to aff ord sophisticated antitrust regimes. Finally, the domestic political economy is dissimilar across the countries. The prospect of political rents leads the government to pursue diff erent antitrust policies, depending on the relative infl uence of various interest groups in any given country.
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The need to explain the diff erences among countries' antitrust laws has give rise to a 'comparative antitrust law' scholarship. Comparative analysis of antitrust laws has thus far focused on US and EU antitrust enforcement. 48 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin's textbook, Global Antitrust Law and Economics, provides the most comprehensive comparative discussion of these two jurisdictions. 49 After discussing the similarities and the diff erences across the entire fi eld of antitrust and merger control, they confi rm that that the EU has a 'fuller [antitrust] agenda' that involves social policies); Nathan Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, 7 Antitrust Source 1, 2 (2007), available at www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07-Bush10-18f.pdf (noting that the priorities of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law are ambiguous because art. 1 lists so many: effi ciency, consumer interests, fair market competition, the public interest, and the healthy development of the socialist market economy); Bhattacharjea, supra note 39, at 624, 627 (observing that public interest has been a consideration in past Indian competition cases, and noting that the clause in the new Competition Act 'keeping in view the economic development of the country' provides a potentially dangerous loophole). 45 See Evans, supra note 9, at 8 (surmising that it is not unreasonable to treat fi rms with diff erent historical and economic circumstances diff erently). 46 See discussion infra. 47 increasing convergence is taking place between the two key antitrust jurisdictions. 50 Both the United States and the EU seek to maximize consumer welfare as the primary goal of antitrust enforcement. 51 The EU is also increasingly embracing the economic analysis of antitrust law, adopting analytical tools closer to those employed by the US courts and antitrust agencies. 52 The antitrust doctrine is also similar, in particular with respect to collusive behavior or horizontal mergers. 53 Still, some important diff erences remain. The EU employs its antitrust laws to further the creation of a common European market. This way, it ensures that the anticompetitive practices of private enterprise do not re-erect trade barriers within the common market.
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The EU also intervenes more frequently, believing less in the ability of the markets to 50 Id. at 1100. self-correct. 55 As such, the EU is likely to err on the side of making 'false positive' decisions, whereas the United States is likely to err on the side of 'false negatives', fearing incorrect intervention. These transatlantic divergences are most notable in the regulation of unilateral conduct by dominant companies. 56 The EU is more likely to bring cases against dominant companies than to rely on the market. 57 Another key area of divergence is in the treatment of vertical restraints. Because the EU uses antitrust laws as a tool to facilitate a common market in Europe, 58 the EU is particularly hostile towards territorial restraints that threaten to partition the common market. 59 Finally, the GE/Honeywell case exposed critical transatlantic diff erences towards vertical and conglomerate mergers.
60
While the substantive scope of antitrust in the EU appears to be wider than in the United States, it is not clear that corporations incur higher fi nancial costs for complying with the EU's antitrust laws. 61 Assume that the narrower scope of US antitrust laws, together with the fear of 'false positive' decisions, causes the US antitrust agencies to underenforce their antitrust laws. Assume also that the more extensive scope of antitrust laws, together with the fear of 'false negative' decisions, causes the EU antitrust authori- 56 See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 255; see also id. at 1100 (listing the main differences between the United States and the EU). The United States and the EU diff er on whether excessive pricing by dominant companies should be considered anticompetitive; whether abovecost predatory pricing should be banned; whether a below-cost predatory pricing claim requires the showing of recoupment of predatory losses; when a dominant company has a duty to deal; and, fi nally, under which circumstances loyalty-and volume-based discounts should be allowed. 63 In contrast, private plaintiff s bring 95% of the federal antitrust cases in the United States. 64 The volume of antitrust litigation is therefore much higher in the United States. 65 Antitrust remedies diff er as well: US agencies and courts employ more aggressive remedies, including imprisonment and treble damages, for antitrust violations. 66 These tools are not available for the European Commission and European courts. 67 Consequently, despite the diff erences in substantive antitrust laws, the US and the EU antitrust laws may deter anticompetitive behavior at similar levels, given the off setting eff ects of the procedural and remedial choices made.
Another focus of comparative antitrust law scholarship has been developing countries. A debate has emerged as to assess whether developing countries should adopt diff erent types of antitrust laws because of their developmental needs. Some argue that antitrust laws that are optimal for developing countries are diff erent from those that are optimal for developed countries. 68 Because of their less effi cient production, developing countries may need to focus on productive effi ciency rather than allocative effi ciency in assessing competitive eff ects on their markets. 69 Also, economies of scale may also be more important for developing countries. 70 This, some would argue, justifi es higher levels of concentration in their markets. Developing country markets may support only few fi rms, which need to be allowed to acquire market power in order to innovate and compete against large developed country fi rms. 71 Critics doubt the categorical presumption that economies of scale require more concentrated markets. 72 They also question whether lax antitrust rules and the protection of monopolists lead to enhanced competitiveness and innovations in these countries. 73 Higher levels of concentration increase the risk of collusion or abuse of market power, suggesting that developing countries need more, not less, antitrust enforcement. 74 Empirical studies have also shown a positive correlation between antitrust enforcement and high GDP, further indicating that antitrust enforcement helps rather than impedes the goals of development.
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Most recently, the antitrust community has turned its attention to developments in China. After 13 years of drafting, China adopted an Antimonopoly Law in August 2008. The new law entered into force a year later. The law states consumer welfare and effi ciency as its goal. However, the new law also purports to advance 'fair market competition', 'public interest' and 'the healthy development of socialist market economy'.
76
It is unclear which priorities will come to dominate the enforcement. The legislative history revealed mixed motivations: some domestic groups favored the law as a tool to control the conduct of state-owned enterprises and to abolish trade barriers among diff erent regions within China; others saw the new law as an opportunity to challenge foreign multinationals that are increasingly controlling the Chinese economy. China's fi rst year of enforcement has reinforced concerns that the law will be used as a tool for protectionism. Most prominently, China prohibited Coca-Cola's proposed ( Assuming that all states have adopted antitrust laws that are optimal for their country (in maximizing either their domestic consumer welfare or their domestic total welfare), the diff erences across antitrust jurisdictions refl ect legitimate policy choices. Those differences would therefore be diffi cult or costly to reverse without reducing the welfare of individual countries. Indeed, it is possible that no one-size-fi ts-all antitrust law exists. 80 Yet, the current system consisting of multiple, overlapping, and often inconsistent antitrust laws creates several externalities that fail to advance global welfare. These problems are discussed next.
II PROBLEM OF DECENTRALIZED ANTITRUST REGIMES
A Increase in Transaction Costs and Conflicts 1 Costs of compliance with multiple antitrust laws
Decentralized antitrust enforcement increases transaction costs, causes delays, and raises the likelihood of confl icting decisions. 81 Multijurisdictional merger review off ers a pertinent example of this. Over 70 countries today have domestic merger control regimes, imposing overlapping notifi cation obligations on merging parties. The sheer number of jurisdictions reviewing the transaction increases the costs of compliance. Further costs stem from inconsistent procedural requirements and confl icting substantive standards which diff erent antitrust agencies use when assessing the competitive eff ects of transactions.
The costs associated with multijurisdictional merger review can be divided into three major categories. First, parties must expend management time and legal fees to ascertain whether a notifi cation in a particular jurisdiction is required. 82 81 Tarullo, supra note 80, at 482; Guzman, supra note 7, at 100-101; Guzman, supra note 30, at 428-9. diffi cult-to-interpret fi ling requirements in a given jurisdiction may magnify these costs. 83 Second, the process of notifying an upcoming merger to multiple authorities entails fi ling fees, legal fees, document production fees, and possible translation fees. 84 These fees are particularly high in jurisdictions that require parties to submit extensive information even for mergers that have a trivial eff ect on the market. 85 Finally, multiple notifi cation requirements may lead to costly delays in implementing the merger. 86 These delays lead to a loss of effi ciencies that motivated the transaction. At worst, they can be fatal to a particularly time-sensitive transaction.
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Many commentators have asserted that the proliferation of merger control regimes imposes signifi cant costs on merging parties. 88 Antitrust agencies across jurisdictions have conceded that multiple fi ling requirements function as a 'tax' on international mergers, perhaps discouraging or delaying effi cient transactions. 89 Until recently, however, there was little empirical evidence on the actual magnitude of the costs associated with multijurisdictional merger review. Diane Wood and Richard Whish, in their study entitled Merger Cases in the Real World, made an important early attempt to account for the costs of multijurisdictional merger fi ling. 90 Another noteworthy study examining the associated costs is the 2000 ICPAC report to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, which examined the eff ects of globalization on US antitrust policy, including the costs of multijurisdictional merger review.
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In 2002, the International Bar Association and the American Bar Association commissioned a study from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to quantify the costs of multijurisdictional merger review ('Multijurisdictional Merger Survey' or 'Survey'). 92 As the fi rst serious at tempt to measure the costs of multijurisdictional review, the Survey drew from a sample of 62 international M&A deals from 2000 to mid-2002, involving 382 notifi cations 83 Id. at 10-11; ICPAC Report, supra note 5, at 91.
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ICN Report, supra note 82, at 7. 85 Id. at 14. 86 Guzman, supra note 30, at 429. in 49 jurisdictions. 93 Though the Survey's small sample size and overrepresentation of European deals limits its applicability, the Survey provides an important empirical foundation for the discussion on the costs of decentralized antitrust enforcement. 94 The Survey confi rmed that the current system of multijurisdictional review imposes additional costs on fi rms in terms of time and money. It found that a typical international merger requires parties to fi le with six diff erent antitrust agencies. On average, a multijurisdictional merger review took seven months to complete. A regression analysis showed that the duration of the review process for any given merger is a function of the number of jurisdictions reviewing the transaction. 95 As for monetary costs, the Survey found that an average merger generated €3.3 million (US $4.7 million) in external merger review costs. 96 If an antitrust authority issued a 'second request', these costs increased to €5.4 million (US $7.8 million). The results indicated that the number of required fi lings was the most important determinant of the total external costs in the absence of economies of scale. By contrast, the primary determinant of the extent of the total internal costs was the transaction's value, 97 since economies of scale do lower the internal costs associated with the review process.
The Survey also compared the costs associated with multijurisdictional merger review to the value of an average merger, fi nding that the average external transaction costs of reviewing a merger constitute 0.11% of the total costs of the average deal. Transaction costs of this magnitude are unlikely to deter transnational mergers. Still, these costs impose a 'relatively small, but regressive tax' on international mergers. 98 As long as the states maintain a decentralized merger review process, this regressive tax cannot be entirely eliminated. Thus, international eff orts to foster cooperation among antitrust agencies have primarily focused on identifying 99 and eradicating 100 the 'unnec essary' 93 See id. at 10-11, 44.
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ICN Report, supra note 82, at 5.
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PWC Report, supra note 92, at 34.
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Id. at 42. These represented approximately 85% of the overall costs of the merger review for the merging parties, comprising legal fees (65%), fi ling fees (19%), and other advisory fees (14%). Id. at 4. 97 To measure the internal costs of the merger, the Survey looked at the time the management dedicated to the review process, measured in person-weeks. For Phase I reviews, average internal costs amounted to 28 person-weeks, whereas the costs increased to 120 person-weeks for Phase II reviews. 98 See PWC Report, supra note 92, at 4. The 'regressive tax' is likely to have a disproportionately adverse impact on relatively small-value transactions. 99 For instance, the ICN Mergers Working Group has identifi ed four categories of unnecessary costs that it urges countries to reduce. These include costs associated with (1) imprecise or subjective notifi cation thresholds; (2) notifi cations without an appreciable nexus with the reviewing jurisdiction; (3) unduly onerous fi ling requirements; and (4) costs -c osts that can be avoided while retaining the current system of multijurisdictional merger review.
Possibility of confl icting decisions
As discussed above, antitrust laws and enforcement practices diff er across the jurisdictions. At worst, this can lead to inconsistent decisions among antitrust authorities. The most prominent enforcement confl ict erupted when the European Commission enjoined the proposed merger between two American companies, General Electric and Honeywell, in June 2001, 101 despite the transaction's earlier approval in the United States. 102 Had it not failed, the transaction would have been the largest industrial merger in history. 103 The reasons for the transat lantic divergence in the GE/Honeywell case have been extensively debated in the literature. 104 Most notably, the US and th e EU authorities diff ered on two issues: the competitive eff ects of 'mixed bundling' and the existence of vertical foreclosure. 'Mixed bundling' refers to a practice of off ering goods both separately and in a bundle. The European Commission was concerned about the merged entity's ability costs. The ICN urges antitrust agencies to adopt clear notifi cation thresholds and to off er prenotifi cation guidance to parties. These measures would mitigate uncertainties involved in ascertaining if a notifi cation is required in a given jurisdiction. The ICN further suggests that states should only assert jurisdiction over mergers that have 'appreciable competitive eff ects within their territory' based on sales the merging parties generate or assets they possess within that jurisdiction. This would eliminate unnecessary fi lings to jurisdictions where the eff ects of a transaction are trivial. To alleviate the burden of notifi cations, the ICN proposes methods to limit the amount of information agencies require, at least at the initial stage. Finally, the Group proposes allowing for early notifi cation of mergers and imposing strict time limits within which agencies must complete their reviews. ICN Report, supra note 82, at 18-22; ICPAC Report, supra note 5, ch. III; see generally MSG Report, supra note 99. See 103 Fox, supra note 60, at 331, 332, 337 (reporting that the merger deal involved exchange of GE stock worth just under US$45 billion, which would have made the merger the largest ever). 104 See id. at 352, 355 (suggesting that the EU had not been accustomed to employing economic analysis of consumer welfare benefi ts in their relatively new merger law); Bradford, supra note 47, at 397, 406-7 (arguing against the theory that the EU was simply being protectionist); William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, Address before the George Mason University Symposium, 9 November 2001, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9536.htm (suggesting that the reasons for the divergence in the GE/Honeywell case might come from the number of economists on staff at the US Department of Justice as opposed to the Commission staff , the greater availability of judicial review in the United States, and the possibility that the EU has a fundamentally diff erent stance toward the reliability of government intervention); Donna According to the Commission, the merged entity's extensive product range and unparalleled access to capital would enable it to lower the price of the bundle until all the competitors were forced to exit the market. 105 The US antitrust authorities criticized the mixed bundling theory, suggesting that it may penalize fi rms for effi cient conduct that will result in lower prices. The other analytical diff erence -the EU's concern for vertical foreclosure -stemmed from the fact that Honeywell, as a leading supplier of engine starters, could disrupt the supply of these essential inputs to GE's rivals, reinforcing GE's dominance in the engine market.
106 Again, the US authorities disagreed, asserting that the EU had underestimated the adaptive responses of other market participants. 107 The GE/Honeywell transaction was not the fi rst confl ict between antitrust enforcers. In 1991, the European Commission prohibited the European-owned ATR from acquiring the Canadian-based de Havilland, even though the Canadian antitrust authorities had already approved the same transaction. 108 The Commission held that the merger would have given the new entity excessive market power in Europe. 109 Canadian antitrust authorities, on the other hand, supported the transaction, arguing that de Havilland was a 'failing fi rm' that would have gone out of business unless saved by an acquisition. 110 An enforcement confl ict nearly occurred in another aircraft-industry merger involving Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, which the Commission threatened to enjoin despite the clearance decision in the United States. 111 The two jurisdictions were able to avoid confl ict eventually, but only after extensive political pressure from the United States; the Commission ultimately backed down and agreed to clear a merger, subject to signifi cant commitments.
The confl icts associated with decentralized antitrust regimes are not limited to mergers. Inconsistent remedies may result each time that corporations are targets of antitrust investigation in several jurisdictions simultaneously. For example, American, European, and Korean authorities imposed diff erent remedies in their investigation of Microsoft's alleged abusive practices. The European Commission, for instance, concluded that 105 The Commission relied on the theory of 'portfolio eff ects', referring to the advantage the merged entity would have had because of its broad product portfolio and superior access to capital through GE's subsidiary GE capital. 106 Fox, supra note 60, at 339-40. Microsoft had anticompetitively tied its Windows operating system to the Windows Media Player, and required Microsoft to off er an unbundled version of its products for European customers. 112 The Korean authorities' approach was similar to the Europeans': they also required Microsoft to unbundle its products. 113 In contrast, the US authorities did not require a comparable remedy in their settlement decree. 114 Confl icting enforcement dec isions have several economic and political consequences. William Kolasky, the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, identifi ed three key implications from the enforcement confl ict in the GE/Honeywell case. First, when one jurisdiction blocks a merger that other jurisdictions fi nd procompetitive, the former jurisdiction denies consumers around the world the benefi ts the merger might have delivered. Second, inconsistent substantive standards applied by the United States and the EU increase transaction costs associated with the multijurisdictional merger review process, possibly deterring effi ciency-enhancing mergers. Third, the divergence akin to the one witnessed in the GE/Honeywell case undermines the political consensus supporting strong antitrust enforcement.
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Enforcement confl icts also increase tensions among antitrust regulators. The McDonnell Douglas controversy escalated into a political battle where the US administration considered a range of actions against the Europeans in response to the European Commission's threat to enjoin the merger, including the possibility of limiting transatlantic fl ights, imposing retaliatory tariff s on European aircrafts, and challenging the Commission's decision before the WTO. 116 The criticism was no less muted after the negative GE/ Honeywell decision. The US Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neil, described the decision as being 'off the wall', adding that the Commission was 'the closest thing you can fi nd to an autocratic organization that can successfully impose their will on things that one would think are outside their scope of attention'. 117 The furor surrounding these high-profi le merger controversies shadows the fact that the instances of actual confl ict are extremely rare. Despite the common fear of inconsistent merger decisions, the GE/Honeywell and the De Havilland/ATR cases remain rare examples of mergers which resulted in diff erent antitrust jurisdictions adopting contradictory decisions. This is remarkable given how frequently mergers are reviewed by multiple antitrust agencies applying diff erent substantive standards and relying on dissimilar analytical processes.
119 One might also argue that corporations can avoid jurisdictional confl icts by conforming their conduct to the most stringent jurisdiction. 120 This, however, leads to ano ther problem, where the most stringent antitrust jurisdiction has the ability to set the standards of competitive conduct in global markets, as will be discussed in section IIC.
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B Emergence of Antitrust Protectionism
Some commentators believe that states employ antitrust laws to further protectionist goals. However, it is conceivable that the mere possibility of a negative decision by a certain authority leads to costs in terms of ineffi ciencies embedded in structuring the merger. The merging parties might, for instance, carve out certain assets of a transaction in order to avoid fi ling in a certain jurisdiction. Similarly, they may do this to pre-empt an in-depth investigation (a 'second request' equivalent in another jurisdiction) or to avoid having to agree to extensive commitments as a condition for clearance. It is diffi cult, if at all possible, to evaluate the costs of ineffi ciencies embedded in this type of precautionary action. Also, the issue is not limited to mergers. See Dave Heiner, Working to Fulfi ll Our Legal Obligations in Europe for Windows 7 (11 June 2009), available at http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/06/11/working-to-fulfi ll-our-legal-obligations-in-europefor-windows-7.aspx (discussing Microsoft's proposal to off er Windows 7 without Internet Explorer in the European Union); Brad Smith, Microsoft Proposal to European Commission (24 July 2009), available at www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2009/jul09/07-24statement.mspx (proposing that Microsoft could release a version of Windows 7 with full browser capability, but giving the user the option of selecting which browser to install). Microsoft had proposed this design for Windows 7 to preempt a regulatory setback, not to provide consumers the features they demand. Similarly, companies may refrain from off ering their products at the lowest competitive price, fearing investigations by jurisdictions with low evidentiary standards for predation.
120
Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1100. 123 Domestic fi rms seeking protection may increasingly turn to antitrust authorities, urging them to block the entry of foreign rivals on antitrust grounds, or to tolerate domestic fi rms' monopolistic practices in an eff ort to bolster their international competitiveness. 124 If successful, these protectionist pressures can convert antitrust laws into instruments of industrial policy, severely undermining the gains of trade liberalization.
Antitrust protectionism can take several forms: states may engage in systematic under-or overenforcement of antitrust laws depending on their terms of trade ('tradefl ow bias'). States may also exempt domestic fi rms from antitrust scrutiny altogether ('statutory bias'). Similarly, antitrust agencies may engage in selective enforcement practices, disproportionately targeting foreign fi rms at the expense of domestic fi rms in their investigations ('enforcement bias'). Yet the key assumption behind all forms of alleged antitrust protectionism is the same: each antitrust jurisdiction internalizes the costs and the benefi ts incurred by its domestic producers and consumers, while externalizing the costs and the benefi ts sustained by producers and consumers in another jurisdiction.
Trade-fl ow bias in antitrust laws
Andrew Guzman has developed a theory on how trade fl ows across countries can impact the type of antitrust laws a country adopts ('trade-fl ow bias').
125 Consistent with rational ch oice theory, Guzman assumes that states 'externalize the costs and internalize the benefi ts of the exercise of market power across borders' to maximize their national welfare. 126 This behavior, according to Guzman, leads states to choose the appropriate level of antitrust regulation based on their trading status as a net-importer or a net-exporter. A net-importer country employs stricter-than-optimal antitrust standards (overregulation), since it does not internalize costs of overenforcement, which are primarily borne by foreign producers. 127 Conversely, a net-exporter country enacts laxer-than-optimal antitrust laws (underregulation), since the costs of the lax enforcement fall on foreign consumers. Both over-and underregulation are instances of suboptimal antitrust enforcement that reduces welfare globally.
Guzman does not draw on game theoretic insights when developing his theory. Implicitly, however, he seems to assume that the strategic setting underlying international antitrust cooperation resembles a prisoner's dilemma (PD). Guzman individual antitrust enforcers' uncoordinated action leads to a Pareto-suboptimal solution as each state seeks to increase its national welfare at the expense of other states. Individual states always maximize their own welfare by choosing a noncooperative strategy (over-or underregulation), even though choosing to enforce optimal antitrust laws (i.e., refraining from over-or underregulation) would maximize states' collective welfare. 128 Guzman also assumes that any agreement to overcome these suboptimal incentives would be diffi cult to sustain as the states would have the incentive to defect from their commitments.
129 These assumptions are consistent with a PD-type game. 130 In a PD situation, each state has the incentive to defect from the agreement, as it can increase its payoff by taking advantage of the other party's cooperation while refusing to cooperate itself. Thus, the primary impediment for cooperation is the constant fear of the other player's defection from the agreement.
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In a PD situation, a net-exporter can maximize its welfare by underregulating whereas a net-importer can maximize its welfare by overregulating.
132 State A, for instance, could obtain the highest individual payoff by choosing to overregulate (if a net-importer) or underregulate (if a net-exporter), if state B chose optimal antitrust laws. State B, however, will not choose optimal antitrust laws. It knows that if it chooses optimal antitrust laws and state A fails to reciprocate with the same strategy, it receives the lowest possible payoff . 133 Seeking to maximize their individual payoff s and fearing each other's defection, 128 Id. at 101 ('each state pursues its own interests without regard for the interests of other states'); id. at 108-9 ('The resulting policies are domestically optimal but are suboptimal from a global perspective'); id. at 110 ('Because cooperative policy is globally optimal, it must be the case that there are suffi cient gains for a Pareto improving agreement to be reached'). 129 Guzman, supra note 125, at 1158 ('The WTO has additional advantages that make it a desirable forum for the negotiation of a competition policy agreement. Most obvious among these advantages is the presence of a dispute settlement system. Dispute resolution is of great importance because if a deal is reached, some of the parties to the agreement will have consented to the system of international antitrust only because they were off ered other benefi ts. In the absence of procedures to compel such compliance, these countries have little incentive to honor their commitments').
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Similar claims are made by Wolfgang Kerber and Oliver Budzinski, who have explicitly likened countries' processes for choosing discriminatory competition policy to a prisoner's dilemma situation. See Kerber and Budzinski, supra note 27, at 44-5. Unlike Guzman, who fi nds that 'optimal strategic antitrust policy' can be rigid or lenient depending on a country's terms-oftrade, Kerber and Budzinski only describe lenient forms of strategic behavior (i.e., the lax antitrust enforcement that comes from a 'deliberate toleration of market power'). Such a characterization of country strategy ignores the possibility that strategic antitrust policy can also lead to exces- Many international trade issues, for instance, can best be modeled as a PD. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists 262-3 (Princeton, 1994) (applying the prisoner's dilemma analysis to explain why enforcement of long-term relations, generally, is diffi cult because of incentives to defect from the cooperative enterprise, then suggesting that '[t]he regulation of international trade is one such problem').
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In comparison, according to Kerber and Budzinski, the dominant strategy for each state would be to lower their antitrust standards. See Kerber and Budzinsk; supra note 27, at 41-3. 133 See id. at 44-5. 134 Consequently, both states are worse off than they would have been if they both adopted optimal antitrust laws.
Other authors have questioned that trade fl ows could lead to biased antitrust enforcement. Einer Elhauge and Damien Gerardin note that the eff ects doctrine compromises states' ability to engage in systematic underenforcement or overenforcement. 135 If a net-exporting country were to enact overly lax antitrust laws, its producers would still be subject to the antitrust laws of the importing jurisdiction, assuming their activities have an eff ect on that market. 136 The prospect of a concurrent jurisdiction by importing jurisdictions renders net-exporting countries' underenforcement irrelevant, steering them towards optimal regulation. 137 Elhauge and Geradin point out that the importing jurisdiction also has optimal incentives to regulate as long as it embraces the consumer welfare standard.
138
Michael Trebilcock and Edward Iacobucci question whether trade defi cits or surpluses would ever determine countries' preferred level of antitrust regulation, given that trade imbalances usually constitute only a small percentage of any nation's GDP. 139 John McGinnis notes that tr ade fl ows have a tendency to fl uctuate, and doubts that countries amend their antitrust laws in response to their changing trade balances. 140 McGinnis further argues tha t trade-fl ow bias would be infeasible to apply in practice, considering that it is often diffi cult to categorize a multinational corporation as 'domestic' or 'foreign'. Hence, exercising bias against a 'foreign' corporation may have the unintended eff ect of harming the corporation's many domestic shareholders and employees.
141 Anu Bradford points out that biased policies may have similar unintended consequences on domestic industries that rely on intermediate goods, since such goods comprise approximately 50% of the total imports in developed countries. 142 Thus, if a country is a net-importer, predisposed to adopt overly strict antitrust laws, those strict antitrust laws would not only target the foreign producers attempting to penetrate the market but also domestic fi rms that depend on imported goods as inputs or raw materials. 143 This assumes that the foreign antitrust agencies have adequate enforcement capacity, including access to evidence, which is not always the case. 137 See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1012-14. 138 Elhauge and Geradin assume that consumer welfare is the optimal standard for antitrust enforcement rather than total welfare. The US and EU antitrust laws both embrace a consumer welfare standard. According to Elhauge and Geradin, the case for a consumer welfare standard is even stronger internationally than domestically, because in the international situation it is less likely that increases in producer welfare will benefi t consumers as employees, shareholders, or taxpayers. Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1103. 139 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 168-9. 
Export cartels as examples of antitrust protectionism
Antitrust protectionism can also manifest itself in the types of exemptions given to domestic companies. For example, scholars have frequently cited exemptions for export cartels in domestic antitrust laws as an example of biased antitrust enforcement that favors domestic fi rms. 144 An export cartel refers to an agreement between two or more fi rms to charge a specifi ed export price or to divide export markets among them. 145 The diff erence between an e xport cartel and a normal cartel is that an export cartel restricts its collusive behavior to goods or services that are exported to foreign markets. Export cartels enhance the welfare of domestic fi rms, which can extract supracompetitive profi ts at the expense of foreign consumers. The export cartel's home state does not have the incentive to pursue the cartel's anticompetitive activity given that the entire anticompetitive harm falls outside of its jurisdiction.
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To illustrate how export cartels can serve states' protectionist interests, assume that state A is the exporting jurisdiction, and state B is the importing jurisdiction. Critics of export cartel exemptions fear that state A exempts export cartels because it fails to consider the cartels' anticompetitive eff ects on state B's consumers. Knowing this, state B likewise chooses to exempt export cartels from its antitrust laws, given that the anticompetitive harm falls on state A's consumers. As a result, both state A and state B fail to pursue export cartels, causing harm to both state A and state B consumers. This yields a suboptimal payoff for both states.
It is, however, unclear that the above description of the strategic situation is accurate. In contrast, some have defended the practice of exempting export cartels. The proponents of export cartel exemptions argue that they are predominantly formed to create export opportunities for small-and medium-sized companies who would not have the resources to engage in export activity alone. Export cartels are hence argued to generate new trading opportunities and enhance (instead of diminish) competition on markets where exporters would otherwise not compete at all. The United States, for example, defended the WPA and ETCA in the WTO in 2003 by arguing that these exemptions 'were conceived as mechanisms for domestic entities that lacked the resources to engage in eff ective export activity acting individually'. See One may argue that export cartel exemptions do not pose a serious international enforcement problem. Even when state A exempts the export cartel from its antitrust laws, state B can pursue the export cartel under its domestic antitrust laws as long as the cartel adversely aff ects competition in state B's domestic market. 147 One can even argue that the decision by state A not to prosecute the cartel represents optimal allocation of jurisdiction: state B is in a better position to evaluate the eff ects of the cartel on its own market. Of course, this argument assumes that state B has the resources to impose eff ective remedies on the cartel. Eff ective prosecution by state B may therefore require assistance from state A, in particular if the evidence is located in the jurisdiction of the latter.
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3 Antitrust protectionism embedded in biased enforcement Antitrust laws rarely plainly favor local fi rms at the expense of their foreign counterparts. But even facially neutral antitrust laws can lead to discrimination if those unbiased laws are enforced selectively. Antitrust agencies are often vested with substantial discretion. Organized domestic interest groups could exploit that discretion by seeking protection from antitrust enforcement or by urging the domestic authorities to take on cases against their foreign competitors. This could lead to deliberate underenforcement of the anticompetitive conduct of domestic corporations, or to deliberate overenforcement of the anticompetitive conduct of foreign corporations.
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Biased enforcement diff ers from the trade-fl ow bias discussed above in that state A and state B would not generally underenforce or overenforce based on their status as a net-exporter or net-importer. Instead, both states would have optimal antitrust laws but would engage in selective enforcement of those laws case-by-case, depending on the nationality of the corporation that they are investigating. For instance, state A might approve an anticompetitive merger between two state A fi rms to build a national champion that can better compete internationally, while prohibiting a merger between two state B companies in order to protect their rival in state A who opposes the merger.
It seems plausible that antitrust enforcers deliberately overlook the anticompetitive conduct of domestic corporations in individual instances while disproportionately 147 This argument, however, assumes that the importing country is vested with adequate enforcement capacity and can hence be problematic if the prosecution of the export cartel requires evidence that is located in the exporting jurisdiction or if the importing jurisdiction cannot impose eff ective remedies.
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Cf. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256-7, 266 (2004) (noting that US law will permit agencies to lend discovery assistance to 'any interested person', even if that person is involved in a foreign proceeding). 149 Guzman, supra note 7, at 100. Guzman expects this type of 'favoritism toward locals' to take place at the administrative level, 'either because the regulators themselves view local fi rms more favorably or because political leaders bring pressure to bear on regulators and encourage them to pursue foreign fi rms rather than national champions'. See also McGinnis, supra note 140, at 128-9, 134 (explaining that regulators have an interest in maintaining an interventionist policy because it enables them to extract greater rents and acknowledging that regulators could discriminate between local and foreign fi rms); Kerber, supra note 27, at 41-4. See targeting foreign corporations. 150 Suspicions were reinforced when the EC Commission threatened to block the merger between the two US-based companies, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, after the merger had been cleared in the United States.
151 Both the United States and the EU accused one another of engaging in industrial policy: the Europeans perceived the US clearance of the merger as an eff ort to create a US-based global monopolist in the large civil jet aircraft market, whereas the Americans accused the EU of opposing the merger to protect Boeing's main European rival, Airbus, from competition.
152 Distrust over antitrust protectionism escalated further in 2001, when the EU moved on to prohibit the GE/Honeywell merger.
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Despite the perception of protectionism, a deeper inquiry into the EU antitrust authorities' merger decisions does not reveal any systematic bias against US corporations. In fact, while 25% of the merger notifi cations the EU Commission received in 1995-2005 involved at least one US-based company, only 12% of the prohibited mergers involved a US corporation. 154 Similarly, only 17% of the mergers withdrawn after the notifi cation involved a US corporation, 26% of the Commission's initiated phase II investigations ('second request') involved a US corporation, and 27% of the conditional clearances were granted in cases that involved a US company. These numbers suggest that any enforcement bias would be limited to a small number of individual cases, or that enforcement bias may not even exist. There are several reasons for this. For instance, the threat of judicial review may suffi ciently deter antitrust agencies from engaging in blatant 150 The claim that antitrust agencies engage in selective enforcement is consistent with welldeveloped public choice theories of agency capture. These theories explain how government agencies respond to the demands of organized interest groups. Tanya Heikkila, The Contribution of Public Choice Analysis to Decision Making Theories, in Handbook of Decision Making 23-4 (Göktuğ Morçöl ed., CRC 2007) (discussing 'bureaucratic pathologies' where interest groups spend resources on lobbying rather than productive activity and bureaucrats allocate resources to strengthen their political base rather than to best fulfi ll their mission); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 287 (Michigan, 1962) (using economic analysis to explain that interest groups become entrenched because the political process can give unequal advantages, and these unequal advantages then further strengthen interest groups and incentivize them to pursue further preferential treatment). disapproval gives credence to those who suspect that the EU is using its merger review process as a tool to protect and promote European industry at the expense of its US competitors'). Senator Hollings further accused the EU of 'an apparent double standard by swiftly approving mergers involving European companies and holding up those of US groups'. parochialism. Agencies must also give reasons for their decisions, and will therefore fi nd it diffi cult to depart manifestly from an established legal framework. 155 Another question is whether some less established antitrust regimes with fewer institutional safeguards are more susceptible to antitrust protectionism. China's fi rst enforcement decisions under its newly adopted Antimonopoly Law 156 off er some indication that antitrust review could be used as a vehicle for protectionism. 157 China's decision to prohibit Coca-Cola's proposed acquisition of the Chinese juice company Huiyuan, 158 for instance, raised suspicions on the motivations behind China's antitrust policy. While it is too soon to draw drastic conclusions based on China's limited enforcement record, the possibility of China becoming a major antitrust force that repeatedly applies its antitrust laws strategically to block the market entry of foreign companies has reinforced concerns of antitrust protectionism.
C Global Overregulation
The fi nal problem relating to decentralized antitrust enforcement is that the strictest antitrust jurisdiction always prevails when a real jurisdictional confl ict arises. This leads to global overregulation. may choose to underregulate for protectionist or nonprotectionist reasons. It may be a net-exporter wishing to extract welfare gains at the expense of the importing jurisdiction or it may simply not believe in the benefi ts of strong antitrust intervention. In contrast, state B may choose to overregulate, similarly for a variety of protectionist and legitimate reasons. Assuming that state A (underregulator) and state B (overregulator) investigate the same transaction, state B prevails. This example exposes the key international antitrust paradox: the strictest regime wins.
Imagine that state A is the United States examining the GE/Honeywell transaction and state B is the EU examining the same transaction. Suppose fi rst that the transaction would have an identical eff ect in both markets but that the antitrust authorities in the United States and in the EU diff er in their assessments on whether the merger should proceed. The United States favors a permissive antitrust policy and chooses to approve the transaction. The EU favors an interventionist policy and chooses to prohibit the transaction. The inevitable outcome is that the EU antitrust policy prevails: the GE/ Honeywell transaction is banned, not just in the EU, but around the world. Now suppose that the GE/Honeywell transaction would have diff erent eff ects in the US and the EU markets: the merger would increase consumer welfare in the United States and reduce consumer welfare in the EU. Assume further that the expected effi ciencies of the merger in the United States would off set its alleged competitive harm within the EU. When evaluating the merger, the EU antitrust authorities would ignore the merger's possible effi ciencies in the United States, in the same way the US authorities would disregard any alleged anticompetitive harm in the EU. Advancing domestic consumer welfare rather than global welfare is consistent with both US and EU antitrust laws. However, assuming that the merger's expected aggregate global effi ciencies outweighed its expected aggregate global anticompetitive harm, the EU's decision to ban the merger would be globally suboptimal.
The GE/Honeywell case illustrates the more general phenomenon that the decentralized antitrust enforcement consisting of both under-and overenforcement is likely to lead to overregulation globally. It is debatable whether the United States or the EU was pursuing optimal antitrust policy in the GE/Honeywell controversy. But assuming that both the United States and the EU are equally likely to err toward under-and overregulation across the range of antitrust cases, the net eff ect is global overregulation.
159 If the EU antitrust decisions overall are more stringent than those of the United States, the United States eff ectively relinquishes the antitrust regulation of international business activity to the EU. This way, the EU becomes the de facto global antitrust regulator, simply by choosing more stringent enforcement policies. 160 Damien Geradin illustrates the same problem by off ering a hypothetical example of a fi rm A's decision to integrate a piece of software into its hardware. Firm B, which off ers only the software in question, launches a complaint before antitrust authorities in jurisdictions X, Y, and Z, after having lost sales to fi rm A. Assume that antitrust authorities of jurisdictions X and Y note that there is consumer demand for the integrated product, and reach a decision that fi rm A's conduct is procompetitive. Assume further that this 159 Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1100-1101. 160 See id. at 1101. decision follows a sound economic analysis. The jurisdiction Z, however, decides to forgo any eff ects-based analysis and declares that fi rm A's conduct constitutes anticompetitive tying. It orders fi rm A to disintegrate the product and imposes a substantial fi ne. In the worst-case scenario, fi rm A would be forced to abandon the sale of its integrated product altogether. This might be the case if it is too expensive to design diff erent products for diff erent markets (for instance, integrated products for markets X and Y and separate products for the market Z).
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The problem of global overregulation could be mitigated if corporations could easily escape from the antitrust review of an overly zealous antitrust jurisdiction. This could be done, for instance, by carving out assets located in a particular jurisdiction when structuring a merger to avoid notifi cation in that particular jurisdiction. Similarly, a corporation might cease to supply customers in a particular jurisdiction or it may change its product design or distribution practices in a particular market. For instance, the easiest way out for fi rm A in the previous example would have been to abandon business in jurisdiction Z. But this is generally an option only when the jurisdiction Z is insignifi cant enough to make abandonment commercially viable. 162 The merging parties in the GE/Honeywell transaction, for instance, could have evaded EU antitrust review only by withdrawing from the EU market altogether. But abandoning the world's largest market was never, obviously, a realistic option. As the most aggressive antitrust enforcers are generally the jurisdictions with the largest consumer markets (including the EU, Brazil, Korea, and maybe increasingly China), 163 escaping their jurisdiction is rarely feasible. Accordingly, global overregulation remains a signifi cant problem. 164 Antitrust diff ers from many other areas of law subject to jurisdictional competition in that the strictest regime governs fi rms' conduct in global markets. This defi es the prevailing theories of regulatory competition. Regulatory competition is often believed to lead to either welfare-increasing legal rules and regulations ('race to the top') or welfarereducing legal rules and regulations ('race to the bottom'). The jurisdictional competition of corporate charters in the United States is an example of the latter: corporations have the choice of law to incorporate in any state. This gives all states an incentive to adopt 161 Geradin, supra note 114, at 203-4. 162 Id. at 204. 163 Id. at 206.
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Corporations may exacerbate this problem by forum shopping. Though they cannot engage in forum shopping for their own merger approvals (since a lone jurisdiction that blocks the merger can block the merger from happening anywhere), they can still shop for forums that will be most receptive to their complaints against competitors' mergers. For example, the European Commission has garnered enough of a reputation for aggressive investigation of anticompetitive practices that US companies will lodge complaints before the Commission rather than before a domestic agency. business-friendly corporate laws in order to attract corporations and thereby increase their tax base. At best, this incentive leads to more effi cient and innovative rules. At worst, however, regulatory competition leads to a detrimental race to the bottom whereby jurisdictions compete to lower their regulatory standards, including environmental or labor standards, in order to attract businesses that are seeking to reduce their production costs. 165 For regulatory competition to occur, fi rms must either be able to choose the laws that apply to them or be able to relocate to their chosen jurisdictions. Neither of these preconditions are present in antitrust law. The eff ects doctrine prevents corporations from choosing an applicable antitrust law through choice of law or relocation. The only possible race in antitrust enforcement is therefore the race to be the strictest jurisdiction among the states seeking to assert their norms globally, given that all other jurisdictions yield to the most aggressive regulator in case of a confl ict.
The 'strictest regime wins' phenomenon could have some positive eff ects, however. For example, it could correct distortions stemming from suboptimally lenient antitrust enforcement. Some jurisdictions do not have the capacity to prosecute multinational companies who extract supracompetitive profi ts within their borders. Such countries rely on other aggressive jurisdictions with the resources to pursue anticompetitive crossborder conduct of multinational enterprises, hoping to free-ride on their investigations. For instance, suppose that an international cartel has anticompetitive eff ects in the United States, the EU, and several developing countries. The developing countries will look to the United States and the EU to prosecute and sanction the cartel. But if none of the anticompetitive eff ects are felt in jurisdictions that have enforcement capacity, a serious risk of underenforcement remains. The United States and the EU will not expend resources in pursuing a cartel that has trivial or no eff ects in their domestic jurisdictions. Some may therefore argue that global overregulation is desirable in that it compensates for the underenforcement of antitrust laws by weaker antitrust jurisdictions. However, many others advocate for more direct ways to mitigate the problem of underenforcement, such as off ering technical assistance to help weak antitrust jurisdictions pursue their investigations.
III TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST REGIME?
The above problems of decentralized antitrust enforcement have led many states and numerous scholars to advance proposals to enhance international antitrust convergence. These proposals range from complete substantive harmonization of antitrust laws to various decentralized forms of cooperation. Some envision the establishment of a stand-alone international antitrust organization 166 that will enforce the harmonized 167 Others propose incorporating substantive antitrust norms within the existing institutional framework, via organizations such as the WTO, 168 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 169 See Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 169 (describing the International Antitrust Working Group's Draft International Antitrust Code and proposal for a mandatory World Antitrust Authority, but dismissing it as largely irrelevant to modern preoccupations regarding antitrust); Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 166, at n.36 (explaining that neither the EU nor the United States has the legitimate authority to enforce competition law on behalf of the world). See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 7, at 284 (proposing the development of a 'trade and competition "guideline" by which WTO Members would undertake to prohibit those arrangements that substantially impede access to their market and which are thereby likely to lessen competition substantially in the relevant market for the products at issue'); Trebilcock and Iacoburri, supra note 42, at 154-7 (proposing a 'national treatment principle' which would prohibit countries from enforcing domestic competition laws in a way that favors domestic producers over foreign producers); Fox, supra note 7, at 1806 (proposing a modest extension of WTO obligations for member states to prevent market closure, but not demanding a comprehensive antitrust agreement); Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 166, at 928-31 (suggesting two possible models for global antitrust governance, one based on agreeing on certain basic principles and establishing a protocol for dealing with clashes, and another that focuses more on technical assistance); Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, supra note 166, at 670-72 (proposing that countries could begin by negotiating an agreement ensuring market access with any noncompetition considerations transparently disclosed). McGinnis is skeptical of negotiating substantive rules in the WTO but proposes including an 'antidiscrimination antitrust code' within its institutional framework. Such a code would ensure that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism has jurisdiction to condemn discriminatory antitrust laws that impede trading partners' market access. McGinnis, supra note 140, at 126-7, 136-7. 172 See Budzinski, supra note 165, at 203-6 (describing a system of 'mandatory lead jurisdiction' where a supranational authority decides which market has suff ered the most anticompetitive binding international antitrust rules, preferring bilateral cooperation between antitrust agencies and endorsing voluntary multilateral convergence through the International Competition Network (ICN).
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The history of international antitrus t cooperation reveals that none of the more ambitious proposals for an international antitrust regime have been realized in practice; despite the well-known ineffi ciencies of decentralized antitrust enforcement, no overarching international antitrust regime has been established. Instead, international cooperation today consists of bilateral cooperation agreements among key jurisdictions and pursuits of voluntary multilateral convergence. This section reviews the current stage of antitrust cooperation and discusses why eff orts to write binding international antitrust rules have failed.
A Current Status of International Antitrust Cooperation
States have attempted to launch international antitrust negotiations on several occasions. 174 In 1948, states negotiated international rules against anticompetitive business practices. These rules were incorporated into the Havana Charter, which contemplated establishment of an International Trade Organization (ITO). 175 The Charter failed to gain Congress' approval, and the world abandoned the ITO. 176 However, the need for multilateral coordination still remained, and the international community has periodically tried to revive antitrust negotiations in some other form.
In more recent history, the EU in particular has advocated including antitrust in impact in order to assign which country gets exclusive jurisdiction over the case); Wood, supra note 43, at 186-7 (advocating an international clearinghouse for mergers, where companies could submit the fi ling form of their home jurisdiction to the international clearinghouse, which would then submit it forward to other jurisdictions for review and optional follow-up). 215-17 (2005) (endorsing a system of regulatory competition for innovation and investment, suggesting that countries will have an incentive to adopt the best laws once they feel the pressure of a neighbor's technological progress). 174 See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 7, ch. 1; see also However, prospective antitrust negotiations came to halt in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial meeting, largely as a result of opposition from developing countries. 179 The eff orts to revive antitrust negotiations by the WTO General Council in 2004 also failed, and antitrust was offi cially removed from the Doha agenda at that time. 180 With that decision, any further eff orts to adopt antitrust rules within the WTO were abandoned, at least for the time being.
The failure to negotiate a binding international antitrust agreement has prompted states to pursue voluntary cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally.
181 Several states have negotiated bilate ral agreements, which allow their antitrust authorities to cooperate, for instance, by exchanging market information, assisting each other in evidence gathering, coordinating investigations, and negotiating joint remedies. 182 The primary challenge for the case-by-case cooperation, however, is the agencies' inability to exchange confi dential business information absent a waiver from the relevant corporations. For this reason, enforcement cooperation tends to be more successful in merger control investigations (where agencies can incentivize corporations to cooperate with the prospect of accelerated merger approval) than in cartel investigations (where cooperation could expose corporations to additional sanctions in another jurisdiction). Some states have concluded formal bilateral agreements, but these are more nonbinding than binding in character, since the decision to cooperate remains entirely at the discretion of domestic antitrust authorities. 187 Indeed, the GE/Honeywell decision remains the only merger case in which the US and EU authorities have reached a confl icting decision. In contrast, developed countries have rarely sought cooperation agreements with developing countries. 188 This might be because developed countries do not expect to gain much from such cooperation. Corporations based in developing countries are predominantly small and thus rarely able to acquire signifi cant market power in developed country markets. Developed countries' domestic laws and superior enforcement resources also give them adequate power to regulate extra-territorially the conduct of developing country corporations, if necessary. Developed countries may also fear that they would be subject to frequent requests for enforcement assistance from developing countries, which do not have the resources to prosecute large corporations from developed countries.
Multilateral institutions have complemented bilateral eff orts to foster nonbinding international antitrust cooperation. Both UNCTAD and the OECD have included antitrust matters on their agendas. UNCTAD has not played a major role in enhancing international antitrust convergence beyond its educational and capacity-building eff orts, and its role in international antitrust governance today is marginal. 189 The 190 The OECD has not sought to harmonize national antitrust laws or create uniform enforcement institutions. Instead, it has emphasized the need to enhance voluntary convergence in principles underlying antitrust policy, domestic policy objectives, and enforcement practices. 191 The most active forum for nonbinding multilateral antitrust cooperation since 2001 has been the International Competition Network (ICN).
As an informal network of antitrust agencies, the ICN seeks to enhance policy convergence, reduce transaction costs, and catalyse domestic reforms on a voluntary basis. Jenny, supra note 181, at 987; Tarullo, supra note 80, at 494-6. 192 For example, the ICN identifi es, develops, and publishes policy recommendations and best practices. ICN Report, supra note 82, at 18-23. See Budzinski, supra note 165, at 228 (describing the ICN's functions and proposing to develop the ICN further to create an International Competition Panel that can exercise lead jurisdiction). The ICN, together with other international institutions, also off ers technical assistance to developing countries with the view of strengthening antitrust advocacy, building institutional capacity, and supporting market reforms in those countries. For more information on the purpose and the functioning of the ICN, see www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. See also Jenny, supra note 181, at 976-7 (discussing in more Following the collapse of the WTO antitrust negotiations in 2003, the ICN has become the most infl uential international regime facilitating multilateral antitrust cooperation today.
B Why Attempts to Negotiate International Antitrust Rules Have Failed
1 Disagreement on optimal rules Section IIB explored the possibility that the risk of defection inherent in the prisoner's dilemma would impede states from pursuing international antitrust cooperation. However, some scholars have questioned this premise. They argue that the greatest impediment for international cooperation does not stem from the possibility of defection but from the diffi culty of reaching the right set of rules in the fi rst place. States prefer convergence to nonconvergence; they just cannot agree on optimal rules to converge on. Bradford, for instance, has argued against the widespread existence of PD-incentives, 193 asserting instead that the collective action problem underlying international antitrust cooperation resembles a 'coordination game' where the distributional consequences of various forms of coordination impede states' ability to settle on any given set of international rules. 194 This theory assumes that diff erent antitrust rules are optimal for diff erent states. The costs and the benefi ts of a harmonized antitrust regime would therefore be unevenly distributed among states, creating a distributional confl ict. This distributional confl ict impedes states' ability to agree on the focal point of coordination.
195
The most prominent distributional confl ict ex ists between the United States and the EU. Despite the increasing alignment of the US and EU antitrust laws over the last decade, some key diff erences persist, as discussed above in section IC. 196 These enduring diff erences explain why the United States and the EU have competed against each other to direct international convergence towards their respective antitrust laws. 197 Even if both entities recognize that increased international coordination would lead to greater general terms the eff orts between national competition authorities to enhance cooperation and advocate policy). 193 Bradford, supra note 47, at 389-97. 194 Id. at 397-400. 195 See id. at 413-15; Wood, supra note 43, at 184 (concluding based on her government service that the diff erences between governments are too great at present to form a meaningful agreement); Guzman, supra note 125, at 1155 (noting that the interests of exporters in supporting weak antitrust laws would confl ict directly with the interests of net-importers who would want strict antitrust laws); Stephan, supra note 122, at 74; Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 169 (suggesting that, although countries may occasionally act opportunistically, most confl icts probably arise from good-faith diff erences of opinion 198 This type of strategic situation is known as a coordination game with distributional consequences (CGDC) or a 'battle of the sexes'. 199 In a CGDC, both states prefer a coordinated outcome to a noncoordinated outcome, even though both also favor coordinating at their respective preferred equilibrium. For instance, the United States and the EU might both prefer coordination to noncoordination given that their antitrust laws today are increasingly similar; neither the United States nor the EU would incur signifi cant adjustment costs if they were to coordinate to each other's preferred equilibrium. Still, it is reasonable to assume that, given the choice, both players would favor their own respective regimes as the focal point of convergence. The challenge is to choose between the focal point the United States prefers (US antitrust law) and the focal point the EU prefers (EU antitrust law).
Similar distributional confl ict exists between developed countries and developing countries. 200 Developed countries want any international antitrust regime to reduce multinational corporations' (MNCs') transaction costs of operating on global markets. They also seek to 'level the playing fi eld' by enhancing MNCs' access to the developingcountry markets. 201 In contrast, developing countries resist the idea of a level playing fi eld, asserting that their small domestic corporations require protection to be able to compete against MNCs. 202 Developing countries struggling with capacity constraints also fear that an international antitrust agreement would impose unduly burdensome obligations on them. Both developed countries and developing countries would benefi t from coordination, but they disagree on whether to coordinate around the focal point preferred by the former or the latter.
Even the proponents of an international antitrust agreement concede that the 198 This assumption rests on the presumption that the status quo of the domestic antitrust regime represents the domestic political equilibrium on this particular issue. 199 Simple coordination games that present no distributional consequences are relatively easy to solve as long as the parties can communicate. Neither player has a dominant strategy: there exist two Pareto-effi cient outcomes that both players value equally and two Pareto-defi cient outcomes that both players want to avoid. Since both parties are indiff erent as to the choice between the two possible equilibria, the coordination is expected to be relatively smooth. In CGDC games, on the other hand, players hold diff erent preferences as to the actual point of coordination. Players agree on mutually undesirable outcomes (noncoordination) but disagree as to which of the two Paretoeffi cient equilibria to coordinate on (focal point of coordination). This makes coordination in a CGDC situation diffi cult. 200 Bradford, supra note 47, at 418-22. unequal distributional consequences of any international agreement would present a challenge for cooperation. 203 This has led them to propose ways to overcome the distributional confl ict. Eleanor Fox, for instance, invokes the spirit of cosmopolitanism as a solution to the existing disagreements among antitrust jurisdictions on optimal law and policy. 204 Fox calls on countries to bar government actions 'where the harm [the action] causes to world welfare perceptibly outweighs the benefi t to the nation's citizens'. 205 However, critics have pointed out that this approach raises practical and moral concerns. On the practical level, data measuring 'world' and 'domestic' welfare would be hard to obtain and, once obtained, would remain controversial; it would also be diffi cult for countries in the WTO to agree when 'perceptible' net losses to world welfare have occurred. On an even more fundamental level, Fox's approach raises concern on whether 'world welfare' is the appropriate standard to use in the fi rst place. As Marsden argues, the national government's obligations should lie with its national constituency. 206 Andrew Guzman similarly recognizes that net-exporters and net-importers disagree on the optimal content of an international antitrust regime, the former seeking lax rules and the latter strict rules. 207 To overcome the distributional confl ict between netimporters and net-exporters, Guzman proposes that states resort to transfer payments via the WTO. 208 This way, winners can compensate losers and thereby overcome their resistance to the agreement. Others have questioned the feasibility of transfer payments in the case of WTO antitrust negotiations. Bradford, for instance, argues that the costs and the benefi ts arising from an international antitrust agreement are likely to be diff use, case-specifi c, and diffi cult to forecast. As long as states remain unable ex ante to identify the winners and losers under an agreement, they do not know who should compensate whom and by how much. As a result, transfer payments would be diffi cult to negotiate. 209 Moreover, Trebilcock and Iacobucci have noted that, even if such transfer payments were feasible, they might be normatively objectionable because some countries would have to adopt antitrust laws that would decrease their domestic welfare. 210 shallow international obligations. 211 The United States has resisted the WTO antitrust agreement precisely because of the fear that a binding international agreement would weaken antitrust laws throughout the world. Confl icting regulatory priorities would inevitably lead to a watered-down compromise, weakening antitrust laws worldwide. 212 At worst, the WTO antitrust agreement would m erely codify the lowest common denominator among its broad and diverse membership.
213 Diane Wood similarly predicts that eff orts to reach a compromise in the midst of vast disagreement would merely lead to international rules riddled with exceptions. 214 Proponents of the WTO antitrust agreement may respond that initially weak antitrust commitments could deepen with time as a result of voluntary convergence and gradual alignment of states' preferences. 215 However, the WTO does not generally lend itse lf well to the idea of 'gradualism'. Frequent revision of WTO obligations would call for new negotiations among over 150 states. These negotiations would inevitably be slow and costly, producing, at best, an uncertain outcome. 
Costs of international convergence
Limited net benefi ts stemming from the agreement Another impediment for an international antitrust agreement is the perception that the net benefi ts of such an agreement would be limited. Several scholars have argued that the costs of a binding international 211 multilateral cooperation within the OECD and the ICN have enhanced convergence and reduced the frictions arising from decentralized enforcement. While voluntary guidelines and case-by-case cooperation may have their limits, they may lower the opportunity cost enough to make the expected benefi ts of a global antitrust regime no longer worthwhile.
225 Paul Stephan also argues that international rules are unnecessary because there are suffi cient market incentives for states to refrain from over-and underenforcement of their antitrust rules. For instance, a state that chooses to protect domestic producers against welfare-enhancing competition does so at the expense of future investment and innovation, the welfare of its consumers, and the competitiveness of its industries. 226 Finally, negotiating and implementing an international agreement would be costly. Contracting costs are particularly high in an institution like the WTO where numerous states with divergent preferences are seeking to agree on binding norms. 227 The need to secure domestic ratifi cation of the agreement in (presumably) most WTO member states would add to the contracting costs. The negotiations would also be slow and cumbersome: the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations required eight years to complete. The current Doha Round, launched in 2001, is still ongoing. Pursuing a WTO antitrust agreement would hence almost inevitably be a slow and costly process. Implementing and enforcing international rules would also be costly, in particular for developing countries with limited institutional capacity, technical expertise, and fi nancial resources. The costs associated with international rules were a major reason why developing countries blocked the antitrust talks in the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun. 228 Consequently, the prospect of international antitrust laws, while yielding certain undeniable effi ciencies, may simply not have been a priority for states due to high costs, limited gains, and the absence of signifi cant opportunity costs.
Agency costs and institutional limitations
The international antitrust regime could also entail higher agency costs, reducing the welfare eff ects of antitrust laws. Stephan has opposed delegating antitrust decision-making powers to the WTO precisely because of the prospect of higher agency costs. 229 All agencies vested with discretion have the capacity to act arbitrarily. Often, states can mitigate these agency problems by curtailing agencies' discretion ('bonding') ex ante and supervising their behavior ('monitoring') ex 225 jurisdictions as an opportunity to test competing theories. Indeed, several commentators have argued that the criticism directed at the EU in the aftermath of the GE/Honeywell decision prompted several changes in the European antitrust regime, shifting the EU's enforcement closer to that of the United States. 241 The WTO also has serious institutional limitations that impede its ability to eff ectively embrace new areas of regulation, including antitrust. 242 Diane Wood, for instance, fears that incorporating antitrust within the WTO would lead to institutional and political overload of the organization. 243 At worst, this could weaken the WTO's ability to carry out its key mission: to liberalize world trade. Several commentators note that the WTO is predominantly a trade organization with limited expertise in antitrust. 244 They fear that the WTO could confl ate antitrust issues with trade policy considerations in its decisionmaking. 245 The United States in particular has opposed a WTO antitrust agreement on these grounds. 246 It has repeatedly emphasized the need to avoid enmeshing antitrust with trade policy. 247 This stands in stark contrast to the EU, which is comfortable in entangling trade and antitrust policies. After all, the EU's antitrust laws were enacted predominantly to complement the goal of establishing a Common Market and ensuring that the eff orts to remove trade barriers would not be frustrated by private barriers to trade. 248 perceptions: that divergences across states loom too great, that such a regime would represent the lowest common denominator, that the global regime would not entail suffi cient net benefi ts to make it a priority, or that it would magnify agency problems or even subject antitrust rules to trade policy. These reasons, taken together, help us understand why eff orts to negotiate an international antitrust agreement have failed. Still, the idea of international antitrust governance continues to invite vibrant scholarly discussion. The last section of this chapter will sketch possible directions for that discussion going forward.
IV CONCLUSION
The above discussion has exposed the dual problem underlying international antitrust law. Section II discussed how decentralized antitrust enforcement can produce externalities and reduce global welfare. Section III discussed how seeking increased convergence across jurisdictions may not be optimal either. This has led international antitrust scholars to search for ways to reduce negative externalities embedded in the decentralized antitrust regime, while respecting each antitrust jurisdiction's freedom to design its own laws.
Debate on the optimal balance between convergence and divergence continues. Two trends have emerged to shape the direction of this debate. First, those engaged in the discussion are beginning to appreciate that the world of antitrust extends beyond the United States and the European Union. Second, scholars are beginning to realize the paucity of empirical scholarship on international antitrust law.
The United States and the European Union remain the two most signifi cant antitrust jurisdictions in the world. Comparative inquiries into their antitrust laws and enforcement practices continue to be fruitful. However, the center of gravity for international business activity is increasingly shifting to emerging markets. Goldman Sachs has predicted that by 2035, the GDP of the 'BRIC' countries (referring to Brazil, Russia, India, and China) will exceed the GDP of the current G-7 countries. 249 The scholarship on international antitrust law should seek to anticipate the implications this development has for antitrust law. This also requires revisiting the distinction between developed countries and developing countries. Today, developing countries comprise a diverse group of states, with vastly diff erent domestic markets, levels of openness, political economies, and institutional capacities. China and Kenya cannot be expected to balance similar concerns when designing their domestic antitrust regimes. The increasing heterogeneity among developing countries has given new impetus for the debate on how diff erent market conditions and political economies shape antitrust laws, how universal the economic theories underlying antitrust enforcement are, and how adaptable these theories are for guiding countries that do not share the same economic or political history and that face diff erent opportunities and challenges.
On the methodological side, while domestic antitrust law has for a long time benefi ted from sophisticated analytical tools, scholarship on international antitrust law has not 249 Goldman Sachs, BRICS and Beyond 5 (November 2007), available at www2.goldmansachs. com/ideas/brics/BRICs-and-Beyond.html. The G-7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. taken full advantage of insights from economics or other disciplines. More recently, scholars have employed new tools, including game theory and empirical methods, to bring more analytical coherence into the fi eld. 250 The ICN study measuring the costs of multijurisdictional merger enforcement was a welcome early step in the right direction. 251 Some areas of international antitrust law have already received more attention by empiricists. Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow have studied the eff ect of international cartels on developing countries. 252 They have also made a signifi cant contribution to our understanding of the prevalence and harmfulness of export cartels. 253 Building on work done by Nicholson, 254 Keith Hylton and Fei Deng have undertaken an ambitious project seeking to quantify antitrust laws around the world. Studying variations across antitrust jurisdictions, they developed a 'scope index' to measure the extent to which antitrust laws of a given country are likely to catch anticompetitive conduct. 255 Their fi ndings are less credible because of their exclusive focus on antitrust laws in books -they do not incorporate actual enforcement realities when constructing the scope index. Still, they have contributed a founding work to empirical international antitrust law scholarship on which other scholars in the future are likely to build. Such future work will help us verify the importance of the problems underlying international antitrust law that are often assumed rather than empirically validated. 
